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 NOTE 
Lactation Intolerance: Trivializing the 
Struggles of Working Mothers & the Need 
for a More Diverse Judiciary 
Ames v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 760 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015). 
THOMAS H. LIMBRICK* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In February 2015, numerous online sources published articles about a 
decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denying a 
female employee’s sex discrimination claim on the basis that “men can lac-
tate, too.”1  These articles were doing what many see as the main purpose of 
digital journalism: attracting attention by way of clicks.2  However, these 
 
* B.A., Missouri State University, 2013; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri 
School of Law, 2016; Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2015–2016.  I would 
like to thank Professor Rigel C. Oliveri for her guidance in class and in writing this 
Note, Professors Jayne Woods and Anne Alexander for their help with the title, the 
three female judges I have had the privilege of knowing personally, everyone on the 
Missouri Law Review for their time and effort, and my family members for their con-
stant support. 
 1. See, e.g., Caroline Bologna, Court Tosses Breastfeeding Discrimination Case 
Because Men Can Lactate Too, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 10, 2015, 5:05 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/10/ames-vs-nationwide-breastfeeding-
discrimination_n_6653418.html; David Ferguson, Woman Out of Appeals After Trial 
Court Says Her Firing For Breastfeeding Not Sexist Since Men Can Lactate, 
RAWSTORY (Feb. 3, 2015, 1:56 PM), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2015/02/supreme-
court-lets-stand-ruling-that-firing-woman-for-breastfeeding-not-sexist-because-men-
can-lactate/; Amanda Marcotte, Breast-Feeding Mom Loses Discrimination Case 
Because Men Can Lactate Too, SLATE (Feb. 4, 2015, 1:54 PM), http://www.
slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2015/02/04/angela_ames_sex_discrimination_case_breast_
feeding_mom_loses_because_men.html; Mary Elizabeth Williams, Sorry, Guys, You 
Can’t Breastfeed Too: A Legal Case Over a Breastfeeding Mother Features Argued 
“Even Men Have Milk Ducts,” SALON (Feb. 5, 2015, 1:10 PM), http://www.salon.
com/2015/02/05/sorry_guys_you_cant_breastfeed_too/. 
 2. See Angèle Christin, When It Comes to Chasing Clicks, Journalists Say One 
Thing But Feel Pressure to Do Another, NIEMANLAB (Aug. 28, 2014, 10:04 AM), 
http://www.niemanlab.org/2014/08/when-it-comes-to-chasing-clicks-journalists-say-
one-thing-but-feel-pressure-to-do-another/ (“Online media is made of clicks.  Readers 
click from one article to the next.  Advertising revenue is based on the number of 
unique visitors for each site.  Editors always keep in mind their traffic targets to se-
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articles misled their readers by making it sound as if the Eighth Circuit relied 
on that notion in its opinion. 
In reality, Ames v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. involved an em-
ployee who sued her employer for sex discrimination based on her struggle to 
gain access to a lactation room upon her return from maternity leave.3  The 
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa commented in a footnote 
about Ames’s argument “that lactation is a medical condition related to her 
pregnancy” and, thus, deserving of protected class status.4  The footnote stat-
ed: 
[T]he Court takes judicial notice of the fact that adoptive mothers can 
also breast-feed their adoptive babies. . . .  Furthermore, it is a scien-
tific fact that even men have milk ducts and the hormones responsible 
for milk production. . . .  Accordingly, lactation is not a physiological 
condition experienced exclusively by women who have recently given 
birth.5 
The actual holdings of the district court and Eighth Circuit, while less osten-
tatious than the online attention-grabbing title “men can lactate, too,” show-
case reasoning that is just as troubling. 
Part II of this Note provides a brief background of the facts and the 
Eighth Circuit’s ultimate holding in Ames.  Part III discusses the legal history 
of Title VII and legislative efforts to prohibit discrimination in the workplace.  
Part IV examines the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning.  Finally, Part V comments 
on the supposed limited use of summary judgment in employment discrimi-
nation cases, the reasonableness of Ames’s actions, the effect of stereotypes 
in employment discrimination, the role that the identity of the judiciary plays 
in discrimination cases, and how this case could have been prevented by ap-
propriate human resource (“HR”) management practices.  The Eighth Cir-
cuit’s decision in Ames showcases the struggles many mothers face in the 
workplace, and while these struggles start in the workplace, they can continue 
into the courtroom.  This Note argues that the increased presence of female 
judges on the bench has played and will continue to play a positive role in the 
administration of justice.   
   
 
cure the survival of their publications.  Writers and bloggers interpret clicks as a sig-
nal of popularity.”). 
 3. 760 F.3d 763, 767 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015). 
 4. Ames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 4:11-cv-00359 RP-RAW, slip op. at 
12–13 n.28 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 16, 2012), aff’d, 760 F.3d 763, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
947. 
 5. Id. 
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II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Angela Ames sued her former employer, Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
Company, for sex and pregnancy discrimination under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 19646 and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”)7 after she was 
unable to pump breast milk at work the day she returned from giving birth to 
her second child.8  The district court granted Nationwide’s motion for sum-
mary judgment, and Ames appealed to the Eighth Circuit.9 
In October 2008, Angela Ames was hired at Nationwide as a loss-
mitigation specialist.10  She took eight weeks of maternity leave after giving 
birth to her first child in May 2009.11  Ames discovered she was pregnant 
with her second child in October 2009.12  Unfortunately, Ames suffered com-
plications with her second pregnancy, and her doctor ordered bed rest in April 
2010.13  While discussing the doctor’s orders, the head of Ames’s depart-
ment, Karla Neel, commented that “she never had to go on bed rest when she 
was pregnant and that she never had complications with her pregnancies.”14  
Ames’s immediate supervisor, Brian Brinks, also commented on her materni-
ty leave by stating, “We’re too busy for her to take off that much work.”15  
Nationwide also trained a temporary employee as Ames’s replacement during 
her maternity leave.16  Ames’s second child was born prematurely in May 
2010, and shortly thereafter, Nationwide informed Ames that her maternity 
leave under the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”)17 would expire 
on August 2.18  On June 16, Neel informed Ames that Nationwide had mis-
calculated, and that her FMLA leave would actually expire on July 12.19  
Neel said Ames could take additional unpaid leave until August 2, but cau-
tioned that this would raise “red flags” and might cause “issues down the 
road.”20  Neel also offered to extend Ames’s leave by one week.21  Ames 
opted for the one-week extension.22 
 
 6. § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 7. IOWA CODE § 216.6 (2013). 
 8. Ames, 760 F.3d at 765. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–54 (2012). 
 18. Ames, 760 F.3d at 765. 
 19. Id. at 765–66. 
 20. Id. at 766. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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Before returning to work, Ames informed a disability case manager at 
Nationwide that she would need to use a pump to express breast milk while at 
work, and the case manager told her that she would be able to use a lactation 
room.23  Ames returned to work on July 19, 2010.24  Her son was breastfeed-
ing every three hours, and by the time she arrived at work, she needed to 
pump.25  Ames asked Neel about using a lactation room.26  However, “Neel 
replied that it was not her responsibility to provide Ames with a lactation 
room.”27  After asking the security desk about a lactation room, Ames was 
directed to the company nurse.28  The nurse explained that Nationwide’s lac-
tation policy required paperwork and three days to process her badge ac-
cess.29  Despite information about the policy being available on Nationwide’s 
intranet and at its quarterly maternity meetings, this was the first time Ames 
learned of the policy.30 
In order to accommodate Ames’s need to pump immediately, the nurse 
asked security to grant her access “as soon as possible.”31  In the meantime, 
the nurse suggested using a wellness room as a temporary solution; however, 
the nurse warned Ames of possible contamination of her breast milk if ex-
posed to germs.32  Ames had to wait to use the wellness room because some-
one else was occupying it; while she waited, Ames discussed her work with 
her supervisor, Brinks.33  Brinks told Ames that she would have two weeks to 
complete her work, which had not been completed during her maternity 
leave, or else she would face disciplinary action.34  Again, Ames sought help 
from her department head in finding a room to pump, and, again, Neel re-
fused to provide help.35  Neel then handed a pen and piece of paper to Ames 
and said, “You know, I think it’s best that you go home to be with your ba-
bies,” and then told Ames how to write her resignation letter.36 
Ames alleged in her complaint that she was forced to resign because of 
“the unavailability of a lactation room, ‘her urgent need to express milk,’ and 
Nationwide’s ‘unrealistic and unreasonable expectations about her work pro-
duction.’”37  Nationwide argued that there was no genuine dispute of material 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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fact, and that Ames failed to show constructive discharge.38  The district court 
agreed with Nationwide and granted its motion for summary judgment.39  
Among other things, the district court found that Neel’s comment that Ames 
“go home to be with [her] babies” was not evidence of sex discrimination, but 
rather was “based on Ames’s gender-neutral status as a new parent.”40 
Ames appealed to the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s 
ruling.41  The Eighth Circuit held that when a plaintiff acts unreasonably by 
failing to provide his or her employer with an opportunity to remedy a prob-
lem and quitting on the same day as the alleged unlawful employment prac-
tice, he or she has not demonstrated constructive discharge and the employer 
will not be liable under federal or state anti-discrimination law.42 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
At common law, employment relationships were “at-will,” and an em-
ployer could refuse to hire or discharge a person for any – or no – reason at 
all.43  During the Reconstruction era, Congress passed statutes attempting to 
implement the Civil War Amendments: the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments.44  One such statute was the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
which established that all citizens, regardless of color, were entitled to the 
same rights in every state, including the right to contract.45  The Supreme 
Court of the United States, however, found that the protections of the Thir-
teenth and Fourteenth Amendments required a state actor and effectively 
nullified the statute.46  By 1963, twenty-two states enacted statutes that barred 
racial discrimination in private employment.47  These state statutes largely 
failed to include effective enforcement mechanisms, which laid the ground-
work for a national policy change.48 
 
 38. Id. at 766–67. 
 39. Id. at 767. 
 40. Ames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 4:11-cv-00359 RP-RAW, slip op. at 
18 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 16, 2012) (emphasis added), aff’d, 760 F.3d 763, cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 947 (2015). 
 41. Ames, 760 F.3d at 769. 
 42. Id. 
 43. JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 1 (9th ed. 
2013). 
 44. Id. at 9. 
 45. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 
Stat. 140, 144 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–82 (2012))); see 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 10. 
 46. See Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 18–20 (1906); FRIEDMAN, supra 
note 43, at 10–11. 
 47. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 15. 
 48. Id. 
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to prevent em-
ployment discrimination nationally.49  Specifically, Title VII prohibits cov-
ered entities, including employers,50 from discriminating on the basis of five 
protected classifications: race, color, religion, national origin, and sex.51  The 
term “employer” has a broad statutory definition: “a person engaged in an 
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each 
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or pre-
ceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.”52  Section 703 makes 
it an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire 
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment.”53  The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 amended Title 
VII’s definition of sex-based discrimination to include decisions based on 
“pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”54 
Title VII cases fall into one of two categories: disparate treatment or 
disparate impact.55  Disparate treatment is intentional discrimination against 
similarly situated persons because of a protected characteristic, while dispar-
ate impact involves facially neutral practices that have disproportionately 
negative effects on protected classes.56  To evaluate claims alleging discrimi-
nation, courts apply the burden-shifting analysis espoused in the 1973 case of 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.57  First, the plaintiff must establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination by the employer by showing: “(1) she is a 
member of a protected group; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) she 
was discharged; and (4) the discharge occurred under circumstances giving 
rise to an inference of discrimination.’”58  By establishing a prima facie case, 
the plaintiff creates a presumption of discrimination that the employer can 
rebut by offering any “clear and reasonably specific” nondiscriminatory rea-
 
 49. See § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012); FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 17–18. 
 50. Title VII deals with actions by employers, employment agencies, and labor 
unions.  § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.  Since this Note is only concerned with actions 
by an employer, there will be no further discussion of how Title VII applies to em-
ployment agencies and labor unions. 
 51. § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).  Title VII also created the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) to interpret its provisions.  § 705, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-4. 
 52. § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.  Courts have held that “employer” should be liber-
ally construed.  See, e.g., Baker v. Stuart Broad. Co., 560 F.2d 389, 392 (8th Cir. 
1977). 
 53. § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 54. § 701(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
 55. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009). 
 56. See id. at 577–78. 
 57. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 58. Elam v. Regions Fin. Corp., 601 F.3d 873, 879 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 417 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other 
grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011)). 
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son for its decision.59  Finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove 
that the employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual and that 
the employment decision, in fact, violates Title VII.60  Accordingly, a plain-
tiff can survive summary judgment by either producing direct evidence that a 
reasonable fact finder could find discriminatory animus or establishing a pri-
ma facie case under McDonnell.61 
Discharge of an employee is one of the most obvious employment deci-
sions covered by Title VII.62  However, an employee who quits can claim that 
the employer constructively discharged him or her.63  In order to prove he or 
she was constructively discharged, “[A]n employee must show that the em-
ployer deliberately created intolerable working conditions with the intention 
of forcing [him or] her to quit.”64  The employee can prove the employer’s 
intent either by direct evidence or by evidence that the employer could rea-
sonably foresee that its actions would cause the employee to quit.65  To suc-
cessfully argue constructive discharge, the employee must give the employer 
a “reasonable opportunity to resolve a problem before quitting.”66 
It was in this legal context that the Eighth Circuit addressed the facts of 
Ames and granted Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment on Ames’s 
claims of sex and pregnancy discrimination. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In the instant case, the Eighth Circuit analyzed Ames’s claims under Ti-
tle VII.67  Rather than claim that one specific event created a constructive 
discharge, Ames argued that numerous actions by Nationwide effectively 
forced her to resign.68  Ames cited negative comments about her pregnancies 
made by her supervisor and department head, the miscalculation of her ma-
ternity leave, and the requirement that she return to work sooner than she had 
planned.69  Ames also cited the three-day waiting period to gain badge access 
 
 59. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981). 
 60. Elam, 601 F.3d at 879. 
 61. Ames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.3d 763, 767 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015). 
 62. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) 
(2012). 
 63. See Alvarez v. Des Moines Bolt Supply, Inc., 626 F.3d 410, 418 (8th Cir. 
2010). 
 64. Ames, 760 F.3d at 767 (quoting Alvarez, 626 F.3d at 418). 
 65. Id. at 768 (quoting Sanders v. Lee Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 669 F.3d 888, 893 
(8th Cir. 2012)). 
 66. Id. (quoting Sanders, 669 F.3d at 893). 
 67. Id. at 767 (“Because Ames presents no separate arguments under the ICRA, 
we analyze her ICRA claims together with her Title VII claims under the same analyt-
ical framework used for Title VII claims.”). 
 68. Id. at 768. 
 69. Id. 
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to the lactation room, as well as the fact that her supervisor only gave her two 
weeks to catch up on work that had not been completed – despite the pres-
ence of a trained replacement.70  Finally, Ames argued that her department 
head effectively discharged her by refusing to help her find a place to pump 
and saying, “I think it’s best that you go home to be with your babies.”71  
Additionally, by the time she resigned she “was in considerable physical 
pain,” as she had gone more than five hours without pumping.72 
Contrary to Ames’s argument, the Eighth Circuit believed that Nation-
wide’s actions demonstrated its desire to maintain an employment relation-
ship with Ames by trying to accommodate her needs.73  Although Nationwide 
miscalculated Ames’s FMLA leave, Ames’s department head gave her anoth-
er week of maternity leave “to ameliorate the impact of its mistake.”74  Na-
tionwide required all nursing mothers to file the same paperwork and wait the 
same three-day period.75  Because Ames could not gain immediate access to 
the lactation room, the company nurse suggested she use a wellness room 
once it became available.76  The Eighth Circuit believed: “Ames had an obli-
gation not to jump to the conclusion that the attempt would not work and that 
her only reasonable option was to resign.”77  Additionally, the court held that 
her immediate supervisor’s expectations for Ames’s completion of her work 
were not unreasonable: The loss-mitigation department merely required time-
ly completion of all work by all employees.78  By treating all nursing mothers 
and loss-mitigation specialists alike, the court ruled, Nationwide was seeking 
to enforce its policies and not intending to force Ames to resign.79  The 
Eighth Circuit also believed that Ames was unreasonable for failing to use 
Nationwide’s channels of communication to resolve her concerns.80 
The Eighth Circuit rejected Ames’s argument that it should adopt the 
Seventh Circuit’s analysis of constructive discharge in non-hostile work envi-
ronments.81  In EEOC v. University of Chicago Hospitals,82 the Seventh Cir-
cuit enumerated two ways to prove constructive discharge: the existence of 
unbearable working conditions or “[w]hen an employer acts in a manner so as 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 769. 
 78. Id. at 768. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 769 (“Nationwide’s Compliance Statement, of which Ames was aware, 
provides: ‘If you have reason to believe that Nationwide is not in compliance with the 
law, contact your local HR professional, the Office of Ethics, or the Office of Associ-
ate Relations to report the circumstances immediately.’”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. 276 F.3d 326 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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to have communicated to a reasonable employee that she will be terminated, 
and the plaintiff employee resigns, the employer’s conduct may amount to 
constructive discharge.”83  Even if the Eighth Circuit were to adopt the sec-
ond form, it believed that Ames would fail because she would still be re-
quired to show her working conditions became intolerable.84  Ames would 
also need to demonstrate that she would have been fired immediately if she 
did not resign, which the Eighth Circuit did not believe was supported by the 
facts.85 
Finally, the Eighth Circuit agreed with Nationwide that Ames waived a 
claim for actual discharge because she failed to raise the argument in the dis-
trict court.86  Absent limited exceptions,87 an appellate court will not evaluate 
issues, arguments, or theories not presented to the court below.88  Ames did 
not believe she waived a claim for actual discharge because in Schneider v. 
Jax Shack, Inc.,89 the Eighth Circuit held that the district court should have 
answered the “antecedent question of whether there had been an actual dis-
charge” before deciding whether there was a constructive discharge.90  Ames 
argued that since her complaint and opposition brief to Nationwide’s motion 
for summary judgment established facts showing actual discharge, the district 
court should have decided whether she was actually discharged.91  The Eighth 
Circuit disagreed and distinguished this case from Schneider, because the 
parties in Schneider did not brief the issue to the district court.92  The Eighth 
Circuit held that the district court “should have addressed whether there had 
been actual discharge because its findings of fact suggested that an actual 
discharge had occurred.”93  Since Ames had adequate opportunities to brief 
the issue and did not claim actual discharge to the district court, the Eighth 
Circuit ruled that she waived the claim.94   
 
 83. Ames, 760 F.3d at 769 (alteration in original) (quoting Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 
276 F.3d at 332). 
 84. Id. (citing Chapin v. Fort–Rohr Motors, Inc., 621 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 
2010)). 
 85. Id. at 769–70. 
 86. Id. at 770. 
 87. Such exceptions include “where the proper resolution is beyond any doubt” 
or “where injustice might otherwise result.”  Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121.  
However, Ames did not argue either.  Ames, 760 F.3d at 770. 
 88. Ames, 760 F.3d at 770 (quoting Wright v. Newman, 735 F.2d 1073, 1076 
(8th Cir. 1984)). 
 89. 794 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1986). 
 90. Ames, 760 F.3d at 770 (quoting Schneider, 794 F.2d at 384). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (citing Schneider, 794 F.2d at 384). 
 94. Id. at 771. 
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V.  COMMENT 
In recent years, employers and legislatures have made efforts to help 
working mothers pursue their careers and fulfill their maternal responsibili-
ties.  The Nursing Mothers Provision in the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act requires covered employers to provide: 
(A) a reasonable break time for an employee to express breast milk for 
her nursing child for 1 year after the child’s birth each time such em-
ployee has need to express the milk; and 
(B) a place, other than a bathroom, that is shielded from view and free 
from intrusion from coworkers and the public, which may be used by 
an employee to express breast milk.95 
According to an annual survey of HR professionals, 28% of organizations, 
including Nationwide, offered on-site lactation rooms for female employees 
in 2014.96  Despite this progress, the existence of a lactation room means little 
to a nursing employee if she has difficulty accessing it or will suffer negative 
repercussions for using it. 
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Ames demonstrates the struggles work-
ing mothers still face.  The unjustly expanded use of summary judgment in 
employment discrimination cases is a major hurdle for a female employee, as 
one – typically male – judge is the sole decision maker on the reasonableness 
of her actions.  Ever-present sex stereotypes about the role of women in the 
workforce and the sex of the judges affect the outcomes of the cases.  Finally, 
despite the progressive step in providing a lactation room for female employ-
ees, HR failures like the ones in Ames continue to prevent female employees 
from balancing work and family life. 
A.  Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination Cases 
Summary judgment has been a fundamental part of Anglo-American ju-
risprudence since the nineteenth century.97  It is a key method courts use to 
remove meritless cases from clogged dockets; however, courts may be over-
using it as a quick method to clear their caseloads.98  Employment discrimina-
tion cases, in particular, “are inherently fact-based and often depend on infer-
ences rather than on direct evidence,” and because of these reasons, the Su-
preme Court of Missouri believes summary judgment should “seldom be used 
 
 95. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1) (2012). 
 96. SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., 2014 EMPLOYEE BENEFITS: AN OVERVIEW 
OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS OFFERINGS IN THE U.S. 32 (June 2014), http://www.shrm.org/
Research/SurveyFindings/Documents/14-0301%20Beneftis_Report_TEXT_FNL.pdf. 
 97. FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s notes. 
 98. See Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Envi-
ronment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 133 (1999). 
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in employment discrimination cases.”99  For example, the only way for a fact 
finder to truly determine whether a hostile working environment existed is to 
hear testimony from parties and witnesses.100  Summary judgment essentially 
makes the “reasonable person” standard meaningless, because it “is a stand-
ard that involves local norms of appropriate behavior that are better judged by 
a jury of the plaintiff’s peers than a single judge.”101  Even if the jury eventu-
ally finds in favor of the defendant, “[T]he plaintiff deserves a chance to ex-
plain his or her position and describe the environment in which he or she was 
forced to work.”102  Ames was entitled to present her case to a jury who could 
have easily found her actions reasonable. 
B.  Reasonableness of Ames’s Actions 
When a plaintiff alleges constructive discharge, “The inquiry is objec-
tive: Did working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person 
in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign?”103  It is this 
crucial standard, which the district court and Eighth Circuit failed to apply, 
that should have allowed Ames’s case to go to a jury. 
Despite the statements by the district court that “lactation is not a physi-
ological condition experienced exclusively by women who have recently 
given birth,”104 it is the “normal physiological state” for women who have 
recently given birth.105  When a woman gives birth, various hormones initiate 
the natural process of lactogenesis (production of breast milk), which is nor-
mally sustained by regular breastfeeding.106  During her first few months of 
lactation, “A breastfeeding mother is susceptible to health issues such as en-
 
 99. Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Mo. 2007) 
(en banc). 
 100. Beiner, supra note 98, at 75. 
 101. Id. at 133–34. 
 102. Id. at 134. 
 103. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004) (emphasis added). 
 104. Ames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 4:11-cv-00359 RP-RAW, slip op. at 
12–13 n.28 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 16, 2012), aff’d, 760 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. de-
nied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015). 
 105. Kathleen A. Marinelli et al., Breastfeeding Support for Mothers in Work-
place Employment or Educational Settings, 8 BREASTFEEDING MED. 137, 137 
(2013), http://www.bfmed.org/Media/Files/Documents/pdf/Statements/ABM_position
_on_mothersinworkplace_2013.pdf.  By contrast, and to address the district court’s 
comments that caused an online sensation, lactation is not the normal physiological 
state for non-postpartum adoptive mothers or the rare examples of men lactating “un-
der extreme circumstances.”  Nikhil Swaminathan, Strange but True: Males Can 
Lactate, SCI. AM. (Sept. 6, 2007), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/strange-
but-true-males-can-lactate/ (citing examples of men lactating as a result of stimulation 
of the nipples, medicine that disrupts normal male hormones, and starvation). 
 106. Marinelli et al., supra note 105, at 137 (“Placental lactogen, progesterone, 
estrogen, and prolactin all play important roles in achieving a continuous production 
of maternal milk.”). 
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gorgement, mastitis, plugged ducts, and abscesses if her infant is not breast-
feeding frequently or well or she is not removing milk effectively while sepa-
rated from her infant.”107 
Due to the physiological consequences of prolonged periods of time 
when a lactating mother is unable to express breast milk, by the time Ames 
went back to seek help from her department head, she was experiencing “in-
creasinglysevere [sic] physical pain” caused by the engorgement of her 
breasts.108  The physical side effects caused by not pumping create more than 
a mere “desire” to pump, as stated by the district court.109  This pain could 
cause a reasonable person in Ames’s position to react in the manner she did 
and refuse to wait more than the five hours she had already been waiting 
while trying to find a room to pump.  Also, requiring a three-day waiting 
period to use the lactation room is questionable: Ames would have had to 
come in three days earlier to fill out paperwork, which she did not know she 
had to do after her discussion with the disability case manager.  Despite these 
facts, the district court and Eighth Circuit erroneously held that Ames was not 
constructively discharged because of her failure to provide her employer with 
a “reasonable opportunity” to resolve her issues.110 
C.  Stereotypes 
Congress passed Title VII in part to eradicate the role that sex stereo-
types play in the workplace.111  As the Supreme Court stated in Nevada De-
partment of Human Resources v. Hibbs, “[T]he faultline [sic] between work 
and family [is] precisely where sex-based overgeneralization has been and 
remains strongest . . . ,”112 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was enacted 
to confront the stereotype “that women’s family duties trump those of the 
workplace.”113  An employer’s objection to a female employee wishing to 
fulfill her maternal duties may actually be “a veiled assertion that mothers, 
because they are women, are insufficiently devoted to work, or that work and 
 
 107. Id. (emphasis added). 
 108. Plaintiff/Appellant’s Brief at 38, Ames, 760 F.3d 763 (No. 12-3780), 2013 
WL 431683, at *38. 
 109. Ames, slip op. at 12–13 n.28. 
  110.  Id. at 33–34; Ames, 760 F.3d at 769. 
 111. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (quoting L.A. 
Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)) (“As for the 
legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an employer could 
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associ-
ated with their group, for ‘[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individu-
als because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate 
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.’”). 
 112. 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003). 
 113. Id. at 748. 
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motherhood are incompatible, [and] such treatment is gender based and is 
properly addressed under Title VII.”114 
The words of Ames’s department head, that “it’s best that [Ames] go 
home to be with [her] babies,”115 are a clear example of the sex stereotype 
Congress intended to eliminate by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act.  Ames was pressured to resign because her employer, through the ac-
tions of the department head, believed that needing access to a lactation room 
was proof that Ames was unwilling or unable to be both a mother and an em-
ployee.116  The callous treatment Ames experienced on her first day back at 
work from maternity leave culminated in Neel’s comment that was “laden 
with stereotypical notions about the ability of a mother to also be a committed 
employee.”117  It is this “illegal sex stereotype that women would prioritize 
child care responsibilities over paid employment”118 that the Eighth Circuit 
failed to consider when it erroneously affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment. 
Also in Ames, the Eighth Circuit included information regarding Ames’s 
previous pregnancy and maternity leave.  Her first pregnancy was irrelevant 
to the question of whether Nationwide discriminated against her after her 
second pregnancy.  Inclusion of such information could imply that Nation-
wide and the Eighth Circuit thought that Ames was taking too much leave 
and was not fully committed to her work, which would further demonstrate 
how the identity of judges plays a crucial role in the adjudication of employ-
ment discrimination cases. 
D.  Identity of the Judiciary 
Each person’s, including a judge’s, identity “[is] the result of [his or her] 
race, ethnic background, nationality, socioeconomic situation, gender, sexual 
orientation, religion, and ideology.”119  Ideally, judges use the facts and evi-
dence of a case before them, in the context of legal precedent, to reach their 
decisions; however, “[R]egardless of conscious or avowed biases and preju-
dices, most people, no matter how well-educated or personally committed to 
 
 114. Brief for ACLU as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant’s Petition for Rehear-
ing en Banc at 7–8, Ames, 760 F.3d 763 (No. 12-3780), 2014 WL 1879148, at *7–8 
(quoting Plaetzer v. Borton Auto., Inc., No. Civ.02-3089, 2004 WL 2066770, at *10 
n.3 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2004)). 
 115. Ames, 760 F.3d at 766. 
 116. See Plaintiff/Appellant’s Brief, supra note 108, at *56, *58. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1039 (8th Cir. 
2010). 
 119. Nicole E. Negowetti, Navigating the Pitfalls of Implicit Bias: A Cognitive 
Science Primer for Civil Litigators, 4 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & 
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impartiality, harbor some implicit biases.”120  An implicit bias is an uncon-
scious mental attitude – positive or negative – that a person holds toward a 
person, group, or thing.121  Psychologists believe that implicit biases “develop 
over the course of a lifetime beginning at a very early age through exposure 
to direct and indirect messages.”122 
Judges’ implicit biases may, and seemingly do, lead to the overwhelm-
ing majority of employment discrimination cases that end with a grant of 
summary judgment in favor of employers.123  In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Su-
preme Court of the United States directed judges to “draw on [their] judicial 
experience and common sense” when determining whether a plaintiff has 
stated a “plausible claim for relief.”124  However, “By placing the judge’s 
own ‘common sense’ at the heart of the decision whether to dismiss a dis-
crimination claim at an early stage of litigation, the Iqbal standard risks in-
creasing the impact of a judge’s implicit biases on the outcome of employ-
ment disputes.”125 
What a reasonable female employee would find severely offensive 
might be discounted by a male judge, because “a judge’s gender will affect 
 
 120. Id.  See Nancy Gertner & Melissa Hart, Employment Law: Implicit Bias in 
Employment Litigation, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 94 (Justin D. 
Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012) (“Judges like to think they are ‘free of bias, 
even-handed, and open-minded.  Yet research on implicit bias and cognitive process-
es teaches that they cannot be entirely free of bias any more than any other person can 
be.”). 
 121. Understanding Implicit Bias, KIRWAN INST., http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/
research/understanding-implicit-bias/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (“Residing deep in 
the subconscious, these biases are different from known biases that individuals may 
choose to conceal for the purposes of social and/or political correctness.  Rather, 
implicit biases are not accessible through introspection.”). 
 122. Id. (“In addition to early life experiences, the media and news programming 
are often-cited origins of implicit associations.”). 
 123. See Gertner & Hart, supra note 120, at 89 (footnote omitted) (“Recent stud-
ies show that more than 70 percent of summary judgment motions in employment 
discrimination cases are granted.  Once again, the attitudes of judges considering 
these cases – the biases and assumptions they bring to their analysis – may be deter-
minative.”); Negowetti, supra note 119, at 308 (quoting Jill D. Weinberg & Laura 
Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination, Experience, and Judicial Deci-
sionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 346 (2012) (“[W]hite judges are much more 
likely to dispense with employment-discrimination cases during the summary judg-
ment stage than are minority judges, and white judges discard cases that involve mi-
nority plaintiffs ‘at a much higher rate than cases involving white plaintiffs.’  Alt-
hough there are many ways to explain this trend, judges’ implicit biases are at least 
partly to blame.”). 
 124. 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 
 125. Gertner & Hart, supra note 120, at 88 (“Indeed, there is little difference be-
tween judicial ‘common sense’ and the very cognitive processes that social scientists 
have identified as producing stereotyping and bias.  When the legal standard itself 
incorporates reliance on that kind of judgment, it places corresponding importance on 
the identities of the judges themselves.”). 
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her or his understanding of the significance of allegations in gender discrimi-
nation claims.”126  Multiple factors may help male judges, in particular, rec-
ognize and overcome their implicit biases, including the judges’ families.  
Research shows that male judges who have at least one daughter are more 
likely to find in favor of female plaintiffs on gender related issues.127  The 
presence of female judges also has an effect because: 
[W]omen judges can bring an understanding of the impact of the law 
on the lives of women and girls to the bench, and enrich courts’ un-
derstanding of how best to realize the intended purpose and effect of 
the law that the courts are charged with applying.128 
Particularly, one study found that female plaintiffs raising allegations of sex 
discrimination or sexual harassment “were at least twice as likely to win” 
their case if the appellate panel included a female judge.129  In Ames, the male 
district court judge130 and the all-male panel for the Eighth Circuit131 were 
undoubtedly influenced by their implicit biases and were unable to fully un-
derstand Ames’s position. 
One way to decrease this inherent injustice is for more female judges to 
be appointed at all levels of the judiciary.132  Approximately one-fourth of the 
 
 126. Id. at 94.  The same reasoning applies to white judges ruling in cases involv-
ing alleged racial discrimination against an employee who is a member of a racial 
minority group.  Id.  Additionally, male judges’ implicit biases may have played a role 
in the delayed acceptance of evidence of Battered Woman Syndrome in criminal 
homicide cases against female defendants who killed their abusers.  See Kristen L. 
Stallion, Law Summary, No Less a Victim: A Call to Governor Nixon to Grant Clem-
ency to Two Missouri Women, 81 MO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
 127. Adam Glynn & Maya Sen, Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Having 
Daughters Cause Judges To Rule For Women’s Issues?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 37, 37, 
45–47 (2015), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/msen/files/daughters.pdf.  This study 
does not suggest that merely by having a daughter a male judge will always find in 
favor of female plaintiffs; rather, “[T]he impact of having daughters being a positive 
and significant predictor of increased feminist voting under all model specifications.”  
Id. at 47. 
 128. Women in the Federal Judiciary: Still A Long Way to Go, NAT’L WOMEN’S 
L. CTR. 1 (Nov. 18, 2015), http://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/JudgesCourts
WomeninFedJudFactSheet-November2015-Update.pdf. 
 129. Race & Gender of Judges Make Enormous Differences in Rulings, Studies 
Find, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 7, 2010, 12:20 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
race_gender_of_judges_make_enormous_differences_in_rulings_studies_find_aba. 
 130. The district court judge was Judge Robert W. Pratt.  Ames v. Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co., No. 4:11-cv-00359 RP-RAW, slip op. at 42 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 16, 2012), 
aff’d, 760 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015). 
 131. The panel of judges of the Eighth Circuit consisted of Judges Roger Leland 
Wollman, Steven M. Colloton, and Raymond W. Gruender.  Ames, 760 F.3d at 764. 
 132. The same can be said about the need to appoint more judges of color and 
different sexual orientations, but that concern is beyond the scope of this Note. 
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federal bench is female.133  Having a more diverse judiciary will: “promote 
public confidence and trust in a fair and objective justice system; provide 
legitimacy to the judicial decision making process; validate multi-cultural 
perspectives and voices; and provide role models for minority youth.”134  The 
federal judiciary has experienced dramatic strides thanks to President Barack 
Obama.  His two appointments to the Supreme Court of the United States – 
Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan – joined Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsberg to make the Court the most gender diverse it has ever been.135  Pres-
ident Obama has already appointed more female judges than any previous 
president.136  While that number is still only 42% of his judicial appoint-
ments, it is a strong step in the right direction compared to previous presi-
dents.137  State courts as a whole are more diverse than the federal courts, but 
only slightly.  In 2012, 27% of state court judges were women.138  Only 21% 
of Missouri judges were women, which fell below the national average of 
26%.139 
Another way to help mitigate the effects of judges’ implicit biases is 
through mandatory education and training programs.  The National Center for 
 
 133. Women in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 128, at 2 n.2 (“Approximately 
25% of sitting federal Article III judges are women; close to 33% of active federal 
Article III judges are women.”). 
 134. LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, ANSWERING THE CALL 
FOR A MORE DIVERSE JUDICIARY: A REVIEW OF STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION MODELS 
AND THEIR IMPACT ON CREATING A MORE DIVERSE JUDICIARY 2 (June 2005), 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/answering_20050923.pdf. 
 135. See Women in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 128, at 1.  If you ask Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsberg when there will be enough female judges on the Court, her 
answer is: “[W]hen there are nine.”  Igor Bobic, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Has Perfect 
Response When Asked About Women On The Supreme Court, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Feb. 17, 2015, 1:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/07/ruth-bader-
ginsburg-women-supreme-court_n_6636328.html.  Interestingly, the Court is now 
comprised of six Roman Catholics and three Jews: the first time in U.S. history that 
there has not been a single Protestant justice.  See Chris Weigant, Supreme Court’s 
Lack of Religious Diversity, HUFFINGTON POST (June 30, 2014, 9:01 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-weigant/supreme-courts-lack-of-re_b_
5545989.html. 
 136. Women in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 128, at 1 (noting that President 
Obama has appointed 132 female judges since taking office). 
 137. This is the First Time Our Judicial Pool Has Been This Diverse, WHITE 
HOUSE (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/share/judicial-nominations 
(22% of President George W. Bush’s appointments and 29% of President Bill Clin-
ton’s appointment were women).   
 138. 2012 Representation of United States State Court Women Judges, NAT’L 
ASS’N WOMEN JUDGES, http://www.nawj.org/us_state_court_statistics_2012.asp (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2015).  This total percentage includes 32% of final appellate jurisdic-
tion courts, 32% of intermediate appellate jurisdiction courts, 25% of general jurisdic-
tion courts, and 31% of limited and special jurisdiction courts.  Id. 
 139. Id.  As of 2012, Idaho had the lowest percentage of female judges (12%) and 
Montana had the highest (42%).  Id. 
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State Courts (“NCSC”) piloted a project in 2012 designed to educate judges 
and court staff about the nature of implicit biases.140  The project offered vol-
untary presentations and training to judges, attorneys, clerks, court profes-
sionals, and support staff in three states: California, Minnesota, and North 
Dakota.141  Due to the finite nature of the pilot project, NCSC was unable to 
record long-term impacts of the training; however, the short-term results 
showed that participants were overwhelmingly satisfied with the program’s 
content and applicability.142  This project shows that quality programs can 
have an impact on the judicial system, and it should become the model for a 
mandatory educational and training program for all judges across the country. 
E.  HR Failures 
Perhaps the most tragic aspect of Ames’s case is that it did not need to 
happen.  Nationwide is among the minority of employers that provide on-site 
lactation rooms for female employees.143  However, having a room available 
is clearly not enough to prevent the issues mothers face when returning to 
work. 
More than half of all working mothers return to work within four 
months of giving birth.144  A main factor for this speedy return is the United 
States’ “stingy” family leave policies.145  The United States is the only devel-
oped country that does not mandate paid maternity leave.146  Between 2006 
and 2008, less than half of all working mothers were able to take paid leave 
 
 140. PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HELPING COURTS 
ADDRESS IMPLICIT BIAS: RESOURCES FOR EDUCATION 6–8 (2012), 
http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/
Gender%20and%20Racial%20Fairness/IB_report_033012.ashx. 
 141. Id. at 6. 
 142. Id. at 10, 14, 18. 
 143. See SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., supra note 96, at 32. 
 144. Christopher Ingraham, Today’s Moms Are Working Later Into Their Preg-
nancies — And Going Back to Work Earlier Too, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Apr. 1, 
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/04/01/stingy-
policies-mean-american-women-are-taking-less-maternity-leave-than-ever/.  See 
Figure 1 infra p. 1108. 
 145. Ingraham, supra note 144. 
 146. Id.; Susanna Kim, US Is Only Industrialized Nation Without Paid Maternity 
Leave, ABC NEWS (May 6, 2015, 6:02 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/us-
industrialized-nation-paid-maternity-leave/story?id=30852419 (“[T]he U.S. is only 
one of three countries in the world that don’t offer paid maternity leave . . . .  The 
other two countries are Papua New Guinea and Suriname.”).  While five states require 
paid maternity leave – California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island 
– there is no national mandate.  INT’L LABOUR ORG., MATERNITY AND PATERNITY AT 
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after giving birth, while 37% resorted to unpaid leave.147  Between those 
same years, 15% were still able to use some other form of leave, including 
disability, but 9% quit or were fired.148 
The percentage of mothers returning to work so soon after giving birth 
and the number of mothers who breastfeed their babies was 77% in 2013,149 
which should require companies to have adequate and reasonable lactation 
policies.  For example, Nationwide’s policy required an employee to wait 
three days for access to the lactation room because of the processing time for 
paperwork and badge access.150  Assuming that the process could not be done 
in less time, the disability case manager should have told Ames about the 
delay when she called before returning to work.  Additionally, it would be 
better for companies to instruct their HR managers to ensure that pregnant 
employees are fully informed about the policy before returning to work and 
not leave it up to the employees to figure it out on their own. 
It is clear that more companies should develop lactation policies, both 
for the benefit of the individual employees and the company:“[E]mployees of 
companies providing lactation support say they feel more productive and 
loyal to the company.”151 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Although the Eighth Circuit’s actual reasoning in Ames did not mention 
the district court’s footnote that sparked online controversy, the court’s hold-
ing reveals serious concerns facing working mothers.  The overuse of sum-
mary judgment has become an almost impassable barrier to female employ-
ees claiming sex discrimination as courts fail to properly evaluate a plaintiff’s 
reasonable actions because of ingrained stereotypes.  On her first day back 
from maternity leave, Ames was faced with unnecessary obstructions while 
suffering severe physical pain from her need to pump.  These obstacles could 
have been prevented had Nationwide’s lactation policy and Ames’s supervi-
sors been more reasonable.  The male judges who decided her case victimized 
her again by failing to see the reasonableness of her actions and the discrimi-
nation by Nationwide.  This failure demonstrates why more female judges are 
needed.  According to Judge Mary Rhodes Russell of the Supreme Court of 
Missouri, “[I]t’s important for the courts to look like the people they repre-
 
 147. Ingraham, supra note 144. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Breastfeeding Report Card 2013, CDC (2013), http://www.cdc.gov/
breastfeeding/pdf/2013breastfeedingreportcard.pdf. 
 150. Ames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015). 
 151. Stephen Miller, Ensure Compliance with Reform Law’s Lactation Room 
Requirements: Best practices sought for interactive database, SOC’Y FOR HUM. 
RESOURCE MGMT. (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/
benefits/articles/pages/lactationroom.aspx. 
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sent.  I think that if the courts don’t have diversity we lose our strength.”152  
The concerns raised in Ames and addressed in this Note will hopefully con-
tinue to be addressed by the increasing diversification of the bench, which 
“makes for a stronger court.”153 
   
 
 152. Collin Reischman, Behind the bench: Q&A with Missouri Supreme Court 
Justice Mary Rhodes Russell, MO. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2013), http://themissouri
times.com/6082/behind-the-bench-qa-with-missouri-supreme-court-justice-mary-
rhodes-russell/. 
 153. Id. 
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